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Does the Political Process Mitigate or Accentuate Individual Biases
due to Mispredicting Future Utility?
1  Introduction
Individual decisions involve difficult trade-offs between pursuing material wealth, status and
fame on the one hand and investing in social relationships and choosing activities that provide
autonomy and the experience of competence on the other hand. There is an increasing belief
that people systematically err in these decisions and that people spend too much time, effort
and money on goods, services and activities with strong extrinsic attributes (Scitovsky 1976;
Frank 1999; Easterlin 2003; Layard 2004).
We  argue  that  this  tendency  for  people  to  behave  in  this  way  is  due  to  systematic
misprediction of future utility. When people make decisions, they mainly take salient extrinsic
attributes of choice options into account. They thus overvalue characteristics relating to
consumption aspects supplying extrinsic desires (income and status). In contrast, individuals
underestimate the utility relating to consumption aspects supplying intrinsic needs (time spent
with family and friends and on hobbies). As a consequence, individuals tend to under-
consume goods and activities with strong intrinsic attributes compared to those with strong
extrinsic attributes. According to their own subjective evaluation, individuals make distorted
decisions when they choose between different options and obtain a lower utility level than
they otherwise would. Individuals find comparisons between attributes whose salience shifts
over time difficult to make, so that learning is severely hampered.
People are, however, to some extent aware of their tendency to mispredict utility. They, for
example, complain about their work-life imbalance and that they cannot manage it in their
day-to-day decisions.3
This paper analyzes whether the political process helps people to mitigate biased decisions
due to misprediction or whether they are accentuated in the provision of public goods,
services and policies. The scholars dealing with the biases in decision-making related to
misprediction usually disregard this aspect.
In  a  first  step,  we  distinguish  between  four  different  types  of  government  to  study
governments’ reactions to people mispredicting utility. In a second step, we identify public
discourse as the key to people’s learning in the political process and the adoption of
precautionary policies. Possible policy interventions that are able to reduce biases due to
misprediction are discussed as an input into the political discourse process. The paper
concludes with two sets of empirically testable propositions.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses individual decision-making in the
private realm when people mispredict future utility. We provide five reasons why the intrinsic
aspects are undervalued compared to the extrinsic aspects, drawing on psychological insights.
The following section III analyzes the consequences of such misprediction on behavior and
utility. Section IV studies the transformation of the bias when there is a political process.
Testable propositions are discussed. Section V offers concluding remarks.
2  Individual Decision-Making when Future Utility Is Mispredicted
2.1  Choice Options with Changing Salience of Attributes
Standard economic theory assumes that individuals are able to compare the future utilities
provided by the goods and activities consumed. They maximize their own utility in a rational
consumption decision. In certain cases, it has proved useful to distinguish between the various
characteristics of goods and activities (Lancaster 1966, Becker 1965) or the attributes of
options (e.g. Keeney and Raiffa 1976). However, this differentiation is not taken to affect the4
evaluation of future utility. The utility of a chosen combination is simply the sum of the
weighted value of each characteristic.
The standard economic model of consumer decisions is appropriate for most goods and
activities, and for most situations. It is still appropriate when individuals make random
prediction errors, or when the extent of misprediction is the same for all goods, and all
activities.
This paper departs from these assumptions: we argue that there are systematic differences in
mispredictions between two types of attributes characterizing different options.
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1)  Attributes of the first type relate to ‘intrinsic needs’. A comprehensive view of three main
aspects is provided in self-determination theory by Deci and Ryan (e.g. 2000). First, there
is a need for relatedness, referring to the desire to feel connected to others by love and
affection (having a family and friends and being in a social setting). Second, a need for
competence refers to the propensity to control the environment and experience oneself as
capable and effective. Third, a desire for autonomy involves the experience of being in
charge of one’s actions or   being causal.
2 Intrinsic attributes are also characterized by
providing “flow experience” (Csikszentmihalyi 1990), i.e. when one is completely
immersed in an activity, often a hobby.
2)  The second type of attributes relates to ‘extrinsic desires’. Extrinsic attributes serve
people’s goals for material possessions, fame, status or prestige. Income thus becomes
one of the crucial attributes of options in the choice set. In contrast to intrinsic needs, the
satisfaction of extrinsic wants does not come from inside but is provided from outside, by
other people.
Each option, activity and even good is multidimensional; in general, a particular choice
alternative has both intrinsic and extrinsic attributes. But some goods and activities have a5
stronger component of an intrinsic nature (e.g. time spent with friends)
3, others of an extrinsic
nature (like most consumer articles as they go beyond basic material needs). Of a particularly
interesting nature is work. Having work gives people a strong sense of self-determination and
being active at work provides flow experiences. Besides these intrinsic aspects, income from
paid work is the input for consumer items serving extrinsic wants.
The systematic mistakes occur because, when making decisions, the extrinsic attributes are
more salient than the intrinsic attributes of different options. Therefore individuals tend to
undervalue the intrinsic attributes relative to the extrinsic ones when they decide and allocate
their resources. When they experience the hedonic consequences of their choices, the intrinsic
attributes get relatively more important and their ex ante negligence is reflected in lower
utility. The distortion thus leads to a systematic inconsistency between predicted and actually
experienced utility.
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2.2  Why Intrinsic Attributes Are Undervalued When Predicting Utility
The following major sources for underestimating future utility from intrinsic attributes,
compared to extrinsic attributes of goods and activities, may be distinguished:
(1)  Adaptation is underestimated
There is convincing empirical evidence that individuals are not good at foreseeing how much
utility they will derive from their future consumption (e.g. Loewenstein and Adler 1995, for
an extensive survey, see Wilson and Gilbert 2003).
5 Research on affective forecasting shows,
e.g., that people overestimate their reactions to specific events (because they are embedded
within other daily life events that they are not currently aware of) or that people underestimate
their ability to successfully cope with negative events.
6 The general insight is that people
usually have biased expectations about the intensity and duration of emotions in the sense that
the impact is less than predicted because people adapt more than they imagine.6
We argue that adaptation is more strongly underestimated for extrinsic aspects than it is for
intrinsic aspects. People adapt less to goods and activities with strong intrinsic components
because the (positive) experience tends to be renewed with every new act of consumption.
Getting together with a good friend is always rewarding, and one does not get used to it in the
sense of valuing this experience less and less. Rather, the opposite is true. Each interaction
with the friend provides fresh pleasure and enjoyment. Similarly, many scholars have a flow
experience when they immerse themselves in writing a paper or book they always wanted to
write. The corresponding utility does not wear off. Thus, many senior scholars, who have
written numerous papers and books in the past, experience flow to the same extent as when
they were young.
The differential effect on the intrinsic and extrinsic attributes of goods and activities is
consistent with much recent empirical evidence (for a survey, see Frederick and Loewenstein
1999). It has been found that individuals do not adapt their utility evaluation in the case of
undesirable experiences that inhibit intrinsic need satisfaction. In particular, severe health
problems, like chronic illness, or illness that gets progressively worse, reduces autonomy and
leads to lasting reductions in reported subjective well-being (e.g. Easterlin 2003). Widowers
suffer, on average, for years from their lot (e.g. Stroebe et al. 1993). Having a job is related to
many aspects that provide flow experiences and satisfy intrinsic needs, like being in the
company of workmates and experiencing expertise and autonomy. Accordingly, being
unemployed is repeatedly found to have high negative non-pecuniary effects on people’s
subjective well-being with little habituation (Clark 2002). By way of contrast, having a job
with high autonomy, as in the case of self-employed people, is related to high job satisfaction.
Frey and Benz (2002), e.g., show that the self-employed derive more utility from their work
than people employed by an organization, irrespective of income earned or hours worked.
Moreover, they can explain this difference with people’s evaluation of the use of initiative at7
their work place and their satisfaction with the actual work itself (p. 25). Intrinsic attributes
also characterize the work of volunteers. It is, in fact, found that people doing volunteer work
are more satisfied with their life, even when taking the possibility of reverse causality into
account (Meier and Stutzer 2004).
In the case of goods and activities in which the extrinsic aspects are dominant, there is
empirical evidence that individuals adapt to a considerable extent. This has, in particular, been
demonstrated for income (van Praag 1993; Easterlin 2001; Stutzer 2004). When individuals
experience a raise in income, their utility level at first rises but, after a year or so, most of this
beneficial effect has evaporated. It has been estimated (van Herwaarden et al. 1977) that
around  60%  of  the  utility  increase  due  to  an  enduring  higher  position  in  the  income
distribution disappears over time.
The evidence of little or no adaptation for goods and activities characterized by intrinsic
aspects, and strong adaptation for those characterized by extrinsic aspects, suggests that
individuals who underestimate adaptation, or even disregard adaptation altogether, make a
bigger mistake when predicting future utility from extrinsic attributes than from intrinsic
ones.
(2)  Distorted memory of past experiences
When individuals make decisions about future consumption, or allocation of time and
information from current experience is inaccessible, they have to resort to their respective
experiences from the past. People reflect on specific moments from the past or access
generalizations about likely emotions in a particular type of situation (for a discussion, see
Robinson and Clore 2002). If specific information is available, it has priority in people’s
judgment. Thereby, the more memorable moments of an experience disproportionately affect
retrospective assessments of feelings (Kahneman 1999). What counts as “ more memorable”
tends to be the most intense moment (peak) and the most recent moment (end) of an8
emotional occurrence. This peak-end rule or duration neglect has been established in many
experimental tests (Kahneman 2003).
We propose that intrinsic attributes relate to long-term experiences of moderate but enduring
positive feelings. In order to be subject to the renewed enjoyment of the type of interactions
mentioned above, as well as to be able to immerse oneself in a flow experience, time is
needed. In contrast, extrinsic attributes are related to short-term experiences, in particular
peak emotions. Consequently, we argue that the intrinsic aspects of goods and activities
related to duration (compared to the extrinsic aspects related to peaks) are underestimated
when people predict utility based in retrospect.
(3)  Rationalization of decisions
Individuals have a strong urge to justify their decisions, both to themselves and to other
persons (for pre-decision justification, see Shafir et al. 1993). It is not only predicted
consumption utility that affects, e.g., the decision to buy something, but also whether people
think that they are getting a bargain (Thaler 1999). It is found that there is a general tendency
to resist affective influences and to take rationalistic attributes into account when making
decisions. Hsee et al. (2003) call this reason-based choice lay rationalism. In experiments,
they find, e.g., that people focus their decisions on absolute economic payoffs and play down
non-economic concerns. This implies, however, that people do not optimally consider various
attributes of different options in order that predicted utility would be maximized.
We argue that, for extrinsic and intrinsic attributes, there is a similar inconsistency in
decision-making. It is much easier to provide rationalistic justifications for extrinsic rather
than for intrinsic characteristics. Consider, e.g., a job offer providing more income but less
leisure-time. Most people will find it much easier to justify both to themselves and to others
why they should accept the job offer, as the extrinsic monetary dimension is salient. In9
contrast, it is quite difficult to justify why the intrinsic characteristics provided by more
leisure-time (even when its hedonic utility might be correctly predicted) are important enough
to refuse the increase in money. As a result, goods and activities characterized by strong
intrinsic attributes tend to have too little weight in decision-making compared to extrinsic
components.
(4)  Intuitive theories about the sources of future utility
People have very diverse intuitive theories about what makes them happy (for a discussion
see Loewenstein and Schkade 1999). These beliefs have direct influence on people predicting
future utility and it can cause them to make mistakes. Moreover, these beliefs play a role,
because they guide the reconstruction of past emotions and make them consistent with current
self-conceptions or beliefs (Ross 1989). Thus, intuitive theories interact with the three
previously discussed sources of misprediction.
An important belief refers to acquisition and possession as central goals on the path to
happiness, i.e. to materialism (e.g. Tatzel 2002 for a discussion in economics). It is found that
people with material or extrinsic life goals report lower self-esteem and life satisfaction than
people with intrinsic life goals (e.g. Kasser 2002; Sirgy 1997). This correlation is probably
partly due to confounding unobserved personality traits like neuroticism (McCrae 1990) and
reversed causality, due to a compensatory reaction on the part of people with low subjective
well-being. However, it might also indicate that people who believe intuitively in extrinsic
attributes are prone to mispredict future utility. In contrast, people with intrinsic life goals for
personal growth, relationships and community spirit apply intuitive theories that emphasize
intrinsic attributes that lead to few mispredictions in future utility. Our argument thus includes
heterogeneity among individuals that leads to additional testable predictions when combined
with previous reasons for misprediction.10
(5) Effects of commercialization
The differential effect of misprediction between intrinsic and extrinsic aspects also depends
on the extent to which the market enters. The monetarization of a good or activity induces
individuals to focus more on extrinsic attributes than they otherwise would. This applies both
to work and consumption. It has been argued that introducing pay for performance leads
employees to regard those performance aspects, which are relevant for the compensation they
receive, as dominant. In contrast, aspects of performance irrelevant for payment are crowded
out (see Frey 1997 and, for a survey of empirical evidence, Frey and Jegen 2001). In the area
of consumption, advertizing is often directed to extrinsic aspects of the goods to be sold. In
comparison, lobbies for intrinsic values tend to be weak and sometimes do not exist at all. To
the extent to which “commercialization” occurs (see, e.g., Lane 1991; Kuttner 1996; Bowles
1998), individuals are induced to make  mispredictions of the future utility of goods. They are
led to believe that the extrinsic characteristics will make them happier than is actually the case
compared to the intrinsic ones.
2.3  Awareness of Mispredicting Utility and Individual Learning
Systematically mispredicting  future  utilities,  even  if  they  differed  between  goods  and
activities, would be of little consequence for economics if individuals would learn quickly in
repetitive choices.
7  If  this  were  the  case,  mispredicting  would  be  a  disequilibrium
phenomenon not basically affecting the notion of rational decision-makers maximizing
individual utility.
A large literature suggests, however, that learning is a complex process, which does not
necessarily lead to overcoming mispredictions. Learning is only likely to be effective if multi-
dimensional goods and activities are reduced to essentially one dimension expressed in
monetary terms. In that case, the individual can be assumed to be able to rectify their mistakes11
to a greater degree within a short period of time. Standard economic models then fully apply,
at least in equilibrium.
In the cases considered here, where the importance of various attributes differ between the
point in time a decision is taken and consumption time, learning is much more difficult.
Learning where decisions about future consumption are concerned must often be based on
reconstructions of feelings in the past. They are therefore subject to the same misperceptions
as  remembering  the  utility  of  past  experiences  (see  previous  sub-section  on  distorted
memory). Learning is particularly hampered when episodic memories become too few and
people rely to a large extent on their intuitive theories (Robinson and Clore 2002). In
consequence,  remembered  utility  and  predicted  utility  become  similar  and  relatively
independent of actually experienced utility. Mitchell et al. (1997), for example, document this
phenomenon in three survey studies about enjoyment predicted before, experienced during
and recollected after a trip to Europe, a Thanksgiving vacation, and a bicycle trip in
California. Although participants enjoyed the actual trip less than predicted, they report
enjoyment levels similar to the ones predicted after the trip when they recall the experience.
Learning, in contrast, is easier when people can access their feelings directly, i.e., while still
experiencing  a  particular  situation.  It  might  even  inspire  them  to  adopt  institutional
preconditions to sustain optimal decisions after the event. Most readers will be familiar with
the experience of not getting together with friends as much as we would really like when
reflecting about it immediately after the meeting. It is just that we cannot imagine how
enjoyable it was once we are back in our daily routine and have to find a date. One of us
experimented with trying to overcome this particular problem by fixing a date whilst still
together with the friends and aware of the pleasures of being in these friends’ company. It
resulted in getting together more frequently and enjoying the meetings to the same extent as12
before. There are also moments of bliss and traumatic experiences that can abruptly change
people’s intuitive theories about what constitutes happiness.
In general, however, a more elaborate learning process is required. The individual must step
back from his or her actual decision-making activity, where the extrinsic dominates the
intrinsic characteristics. He or she should attempt to make an overall evaluation, including
undertaking some critical self-examination, or should resort to what has been called “double-
loop learning” (see Argyris and Schön 1978). As such elaborate learning is more costly, and
is in itself subject to errors, individuals are not able to fully correct their mispredictions within
a reasonably short period of time. In many cases, they are even incapable of correcting at all,
so that the misprediction of future utilities persists over time.
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Limited  learning  can  well  co-exist  with  people’s  partial  awareness  of  their  or  others
mispredicting utility.
9 Many people talk, for example, about their difficulties and mistakes in
balancing  work  and  life.  Yet,  still  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  they  make  decisions
underestimating intrinsic attributes relative to extrinsic attributes.
10
3  Consequences
The mispredictions of future utility from goods and activities, depending on their intrinsic and
extrinsic attributes, have two immediate consequences:
(1)  Goods and activities with pronounced intrinsic attributes are under-consumed relative to
those with pronounced extrinsic attributes.
(2)  The systematic distortions in allocation due to utility misprediction reduce individuals’
experienced utility according to the their own best interests.
These consequences and the discussed sources link up to various strands of literature where
similar phenomena have been identified:13
ß  The aspect of underestimated adaptation to new situations is neatly introduced in
theoretical  models  of  intertemporal  decision-making  with  habit  formation
(Loewenstein  et  al.  2003).  Based  on  their  model  of  projection  bias,  various
phenomena  can  be  modeled,  like  the  misguided  purchase  of  durable  goods  or
consumption profiles with too much consumption early in life. Misprediction of utility
thus provides an alternative to seemingly irrational saving behavior that is usually
addressed in a framework of individuals with self-control problems.
11 Interesting
implications  follow  when  people  mispredict  adaptation  in  situations  where  the
endowment effect applies. The endowment effect is commonly understood as the
result of (i) people adapting to owning or not owning an object and (ii) people feeling
higher utility losses in absolute terms when they give up the object than when they
obtain it. Underestimating adaptation then leads to accentuated feelings of loss
aversion and a much stronger endowment effect (Loewenstein et al. 2003, 1234).
ß  It has been argued that the “work-life” balance of individuals today is distorted.
People are induced to work too much, and to disregard other aspects of life. This
proposition has been forcefully put forward for the United States, where individuals
are said to be “overworked” (Schorr 1991). This is consistent with our hypothesis that
individuals tend to focus too much on options characterized by strong extrinsic
attributes, in particular income, compared to intrinsic attributes.
12
ß  Competing for status involves negative externalities, and therefore too much effort is
invested in gaining status and acquiring “positional goods” (Frank 1985, 1999). Such
goods are characterized by very strong extrinsic attributes. In the saying “Keeping up
with the Jones’s”, it is revealed that their consumption is externally oriented. Thus
misprediction of utility is likely to magnify the distortions of status competition in
consumption.14
ß  Procedural utility, i.e. the satisfaction derived from the process itself rather than from
its outcome, relates to innate needs. The utility derived from a particular process
contributes to competence, relatedness and autonomy, and is therefore closely related
to the intrinsic attributes of goods and activities (see the survey by Frey, Benz and
Stutzer  2004).  According  to  our  propositions,  sources  of  procedural  utility  are
expected to be underestimated in people’s decisions. Consistent with this idea, it has
been empirically shown (Tyler et al. 1999) that, when making decisions, individuals
tend to prefer institutions promising favorable outcomes. But ex post they state that
they would have preferred an institution putting more emphasis on (just) procedures.
ß  There is a long tradition in economics arguing that individuals tend to focus too much
on material goods and disregard goods providing non-material benefits (see Lebergott
1993; Lane 1991). Most importantly, Scitovsky (1976) claimed that “comfort goods”
are over-consumed compared to goods providing “stimulation”. The former have a
strong extrinsic component, while the latter correspond closely to the intrinsic aspect,
as stimulation importantly renews the satisfaction denied.
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ß  In an empirical test of people mispredicting utility, people’s decision for commuting
longer or shorter hours is analyzed (Frey and Stutzer 2003a). The commuting decision
involves the trade-off between the salary or the quality of housing on the one hand and
commuting time on the other hand. Rational utility maximizers only commute when
they are compensated. However, when people overestimate utility from goods serving
extrinsic wants, they are expected to opt for too much commuting and suffer lower
utility. It is found that commuting is by far not fully compensated and, on average,
people who commute one hour one way would need an additional 40% of their
monthly wage to be as satisfied with their life as people who do not commute. There15
is, however, significant variation between people. Incomplete compensation is much
stronger for people with strong extrinsic life goals.
4  Mispredicting Utility and the Political Process
4.1  Government Reactions in Four Standard Models of Government
We speculate in our analysis how politics affects the utility losses incurred by individuals due
to their misprediction of utility. In particular, does political intervention (i.e. the supply of
public goods, services and regulations, in short called “public goods”) mitigate or accentuate
the utility loss due to individual misprediction?
We proceed by considering two “ideal types” of government implied by the classical welfare
theoretic approach and by the (dominant) Public Choice approach. Then we consider two
more realistic models of government, a dictatorial and a democratic one.
(1) Omniscient benevolent dictator
The  traditional  social  welfare  approach  implicitly,  and  often  explicitly,  assumes  an
“omniscient benevolent dictator” (see Brennan and Buchanan 1986; Buchanan 1991). The
dictator has the power to put all political ideas into action. He is completely informed and has
the best of intentions. He wants to help individuals to reach the highest utility possible
according to their own evaluations.
The dictator offers many public goods with strong “intrinsic” attributes, despite the fact that
the individuals do not value them highly when they learn about the dictator’s decision. But the
dictator knows that the individuals will value them more highly in the future. As the dictator
also knows individuals’ discount rate, he is able to provide those public goods, producing
maximum accumulated experienced utility over time for the individuals. The public goods
and services supplied promote personal interaction, by providing communal meeting places,16
by granting paid maternity leave, by regulating shopping hours or the maximum work week,
by supporting the arts and sports, etc. The applied policies foster people’s self-determination
by giving them a say in economic democracy and by providing full employment.
In contrast, the dictator offers few public goods with strong “extrinsic” attributes. He
correctly foresees that the individuals get used to them and that they will reap lower utility in
the future. These are public goods, services and regulations, spurring growth in consumption
such as subsidized mobility or the abandonment of employee protection.
An “omniscient benevolent dictator” thus does not mispredict the utility people get from
public goods in the future and may to some extent even correct people’s mispredictions of
their own future utility derived from the consumption of goods and services in the private
realm.
This approach is faced with fundamental problems (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; for a survey
see Frey 1983; Brennan and Buchanan 1986). No dictator has full discretionary power to
undertake the benevolent policies. He is to some extent restricted by other actors, in particular
by competing elites such as the military and other politicians. He has little incentive to
become informed about the preferences of the people, and he has no incentives to correct their
mispredictions  about  their  future  utility.  Rather,  a  dictator  pursues  his  own  interests,
consisting in creating a good life for himself, his family and his cronies, and securing his
position.
The “omniscient benevolent dictator” is indeed an “ideal type” in the sense of Max Weber not
existing in reality.
(2) Perfectly competitive parties in a democracy
The dominant approach in the Economic Theory of Politics or Public Choice is the “Median
Voter Model” resulting from “perfectly competitive parties in a democracy” (Downs 1957;17
for a survey see Mueller 2003). In this model, strictly two parties exist with continuous
elections and complete voter participation. Under these conditions, the policies undertaken
converge to the preferences of the median voter. As nothing is known about the distribution of
preferences with regard to goods with different intensities of extrinsic and intrinsic attributes,
a normal preference distribution can be assumed, so that the median voter is the average voter
and citizen.
The party leaders are not fully informed, but seek to collect sufficient information to take care
of the average voters’ preferences. Neither of the two parties have any discretionary leeway,
but have to strictly aim at fulfilling the median voter’s preference. At election time, the parties
must offer policy bundles pleasing the voters. They offer public goods with strong extrinsic
attributes, but whose future utility is overestimated. They cannot afford to supply public
goods with strong intrinsic attributes, because the voters do not predict their higher future
utility and vote strictly instrumentally. Income transfers, tax reductions, material goods and
policies spurring growth are thus preferred, while public goods with strong intrinsic attributes
and policies favoring interaction and “good” processes are disregarded.
In  a  “perfectly  competitive  democratic  system  of  party  competition”,  individuals’
mispredictions are carried forward in the provision of public goods and services, and
individual biases might even be accentuated rather than corrected.
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This standard Public Choice model can be criticized from several points of view. The
situation of perfect political competition with strictly two parties exists nowhere. In all
countries there are more than two parties actually or potentially competing with each other.
With more than two parties, no equilibrium (for three parties) or different or several equilibria
from the median exist (Selten 1971; Mueller 2003). There are many imperfections on the
demand and supply side of the democratic process. In particular, the incumbent party has
great advantages over its contenders. Information about individuals’ preferences is seriously18
limited. Moreover, people decide about candidates and issues after election and voting
campaigns with widespread political debates, which partly form people’s preferences.
The model of perfect party competition is again an “ideal type” not existing in reality. We
now discuss two more realistic types of government, one a “Paternalist Government in an
Authoritarian System”, the other a “Majority Government in a Democracy”.
(3) Paternalist government in an authoritarian system
The government has discretionary power to undertake those policies it sees fit to implement,
but is limited by other actors. The people’s preferences only play a small role because the
probability of the authoritarian government being toppled by a popular uprising is small (see
Tullock 1987). Nevertheless, the ruler pacifies the people, especially in the capital, by
offering “panem et circenses”, which are public goods with strongly extrinsic attributes and
with low future utility. The authoritarian ruler has to be more afraid of a military or police
takeover, or a political or social elite takeover. He therefore makes an effort to check their
aspirations by providing them with material benefits (such as a good income and easily
exploitable monopolistic positions), as well as with immaterial rewards such as titles and
orders. At the same time, he threatens them with hard sanctions if they oppose him. The
ruler’s information is incomplete, though he makes a great effort to know what people think
and what is going on in his country. But the information received by him is typically
distorted. His underlings have learnt that they do best to provide their ruler with information
favorable to him.
A paternalistic ruler tends to accentuate individuals’ utility losses due to misprediction, as he
offers public goods with strong extrinsic attributes. But this effect is somewhat mitigated by
the fact that the ruler may have a long-term view. The authoritarian German Democratic
Republic, while economically very inefficient, may have had one good side, namely fostering19
conditions enabling community interactions such as volunteering (see Meier and Stutzer
2004).
(4) Majority government in democracy
To stay in power, a party in a democracy must be re-elected. The government has little
discretionary room at election time if its re-election chances are low. In that case, it has an
interest to cater to voters’ short-term preferences. It supplies and promises public goods with
marked extrinsic attributes in order to please the voters. These are the well-known election
presents consisting mainly in monetary transfers. Such policy aggravates individuals’ utility
losses due to misprediction. A majority government thus tends to discontinually accentuate
individuals’ losses due to misprediction. This is the best strategy, even if voters experience
and realize after elections that the policies are suboptimal.
However, many government parties are reasonably confident of winning the next elections
and are not forced to undertake policies producing short run benefits. Moreover, after the
elections have passed, the party in power has considerable leeway to pursue a policy
following its own ideological preferences (see the econometric models of government
behavior and of the political business cycle in Frey and Schneider 1978a; 1978b). Depending
on its ideology, public goods will be offered, which may accentuate or reduce individuals’
utility losses due to misprediction. Ex ante, it is not known whether a move in the direction of
extrinsic or intrinsic attributes will prevail.
4.2  Extending the Democratic Models of Politics: Learning by Individuals in the
Political Process
A crucial characteristic of the political process in a democracy is the political discourse. “The
definition of democracy as ‘government by discussion’ implies that individual values can and
do change in the process of decision-making” (Buchanan 1954, 120). In addition, people’s20
behavior in the political realm is strongly influenced by their motivation to express their
values and views (Brennan and Lomasky 1993; for empirical evidence, see e.g. Copeland and
Laband 2002). Both aspects potentially allow for political decisions that are not biased by
misprediction of utility from publicly provided goods, services and regulation. It might even
be  possible  to  overcome  some  of  the  negative  effects  that  misprediction  produces  in
individual decision-making in the private realm. While public discourse enables learning by
individuals, it also creates an incentive for governments to respond to citizens’ needs.
15
The four psychological sources of misprediction analyzed in section 2 can be transformed in
the process of political discourse and expressive voting. In political discussions, people bring
in their ideas of what would be good for them in general. Thereby, they are partly aware of
their misprediction in day-to-day decisions. Examples are the debates about working time
restrictions. At least some arguments contain the notion that spending time with family and
friends brings renewed pleasure, while it is futile to accumulate more and more material
goods.
16 That there are differences in the degree of adaptation thus realized. Compared to
individual decisions, which often have to rely on past experience, there is the possibility in
discussions to dialogue with people, for example, who at that time are experiencing a
particular situation, like being unemployed. Biases due to distorted memory or missing
experiences are thus attenuated. As voters make a decision, which also affects their fellow
citizens, other reasons for rationalizing and justifying decisions are taken into account.
Moreover, secret ballots make it not necessary to choose extrinsic attributes to facilitate
justification towards other people. In the act of voting in favor of an issue, or voting for a
candidate, the awareness of the problem can thus be expected to be expressed. The most
fundamental contribution of the political discussion is about changing intuitive theories of
happiness. It can be expected that the more the discussion fulfills the normative criteria of a21
discourse free of constraints (in the sense of discourse ethics, see e.g. Habermas 1993), the
more likely existing beliefs about the sources of happiness are challenged and reconsidered.
There is substantial evidence that people base many of their opinions on what they discuss
with other people (see e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Walsh 2004). In order to learn about
the ideas of other persons, the composition of the discussion group is relevant. In order to gain
greater awareness of rationales for alternative perspectives, the extent to which the group
includes people with opposing views is important (e.g. Mutz 2002). Besides the effect on
political tolerance, discussion affects behavior. In many laboratory experiments, the role of
discussion in affecting individuals’ decisions about contributing to public goods is shown (see
e.g. Bohnet and Frey 1999).
The intensity and quality of political discussion depends on the type of democratic political
institutions existing and the organization (or property structure) of the media. In a democratic
system with proportional representation, a broader range of arguments is put forward than in a
majoritarian system with often mainly two parties (see, e.g., Karp and Banducci 2002, for
New Zealand, a country that switched to proportional representation). In a democracy
allowing for direct democratic participation in important policy areas, issues not discussed in
an election campaign focusing on a very limited range of topics, are taken up and put to the
vote. In an empirical study for Switzerland and the European Union, citizens’ information
about politics is related to the degree of direct democracy in Swiss cantons and whether there
were national referendums about EU treaties (Benz and Stutzer 2004). It is found that citizens
know more and feel subjectively better informed when they have a say in politics. This result
is argued to be due to the public debates preceding and following referendums. The political
discussion in the public is more likely to involve and affect politicians when they are
organized in relatively democratic party structures rather than in strict party hierarchies that
can easily enforce faction discipline (Teorell 1999). Arguments discussed in the media, and22
that are free from political influence, are more likely to challenge individuals’ beliefs about
the sources of happiness than arguments put forward in the media captured by some special
interests or monopolistic media moguls.
17 There is, in fact, a wide variety in media ownership
structures  across  countries  (Djankov  et  al.  2003).  Whereby  a  large  influence  of  the
government is related to less freedom of the press, fewer political rights for citizens and
inferior governance and health outcomes. Having free media does not automatically mean that
people are exposed to alternative perspectives and are prompted to reflect on the reasons for
their beliefs. First, people might selectively choose media-content that is like-minded.
Second, exposure to contrary information can also result in the strengthening of existing
attitudes, depending on how people cognitively respond to opposing views (Sieck and Yates
1997). All these aspects can potentially serve as empirically testable hypotheses about the
extent to which misprediction is carried forward in decisions in the democratic process, or the
extent to which political decisions can help to prevent wrong decisions on the individual level
(see sub-section 4.6).
4.3  Inputs into the Discourse Process to Counteract Individuals’ Misprediction of
Utility
There are many proposals that can be put forward in the discourse process to reduce
individuals’ misguided pursuit of status and material possessions and to make choices with
strong  intrinsic  attributes,  like  spending  time  with  family  and  friends relatively  more
attractive.  Most  straightforward  from  an  economic  perspective  are  proposals  to  tax
consumption more heavily, either via a consumption tax (Frank 1999) or a high income tax
(Layard 2004). However, taxation only works when individuals’ status is due to absolute
consumption level rather than due to consuming relatively more expensive goods. In fact, it
seems that the latter situation describes the market for positional goods, like front row seats at23
the opera or a house with a lovely view, and many services like medical care from the best
doctors. Other proposals involve subsidies of goods that are underconsumed rather than
taxation of those goods overconsumed. Most prominent is Scitovsky (1976), who argues for
government support of the arts, architecture and education to bring about more stimulation in
people’s life rather than comfort.
Another sort of government intervention is through regulation or the setting of defaults. Many
specific areas allow for rules that make leisure time more attractive. This is addressed most
directly by working time regulation. Mandatory maximum working hours may help to
coordinate on earning less money that can be spent for positional goods. These regulations
can, of course, be partly circumvented by taking up a second job or working in the shadow
economy. However, they may have a strong expressive component. It becomes salient that
working less, given the income level reached, would be good and the respective rule may help
to justify working less hours and spending more time socializing. Related to working hour
restrictions are policies for maternity and parental leave (for an overview see OECD 1998).
They are promoted as family-friendly policies that can help create a better balance between
work and family-life. Regulation of shopping hours is another regulation that might help
coordinate leisure time and that frees people from making a trade-off between spending time
shopping or working (e.g. extra work in a shop) on the one hand and meeting friends or
pursuing a hobby on the other hand.
When people overestimate utility from consumption and form consumption habits, they might
end up spending too much early in life and saving too little for retirement (Loewenstein et al.
2003) or may even accumulate debts from consumer credits. One possible reaction from the
regulator is to restrict consumer credits (e.g. by maximum interest rates) and, in the case of
saving for retirement, to introduce mandatory pension schemes. However, these interventions
might have high costs for those who are less prone to misprediction, because they cannot24
escape the regulations. An alternative is provided by regulations that apply “asymmetric
paternalism” (Camerer et al. 2003) and give people the possibility to opt out of a contract
designed to help them overcome biases in decision-making. Pertinent examples are savings
plans that provide self-binding mechanisms. One possibility are plans for which employees
are automatically enrolled (i.e. default option) when they start a job and need to actively opt
out of when they do not want to follow the savings plan. In another program, employees are
asked to commit in advance that they contribute a fraction of their future salary increases into
a savings account (Thaler and Benartzi 2004).
Misprediction is argued to have particularly marked effects when it coincides with the
endowment effect (section 3). Many policy arrangements can be illustrated to mitigate
mistakes in decision-making. For example, when books and newspapers are sent to consumers
without having been requested, the perception of succumbing to the endowment effect may be
raised by facilitating comparison. For this purpose, comparative advertising by competing
suppliers (which would, e.g., point out the higher price charged) or by consumer agencies,
may be encouraged or mandated. For striking a deal, the consent of both adult members of a
household might be required by law. Self-commitment could be facilitated if people have the
right to have all unsolicited goods and services automatically returned to the sender (at the
sender’s expense). In some cases, one could have the right to exclude oneself from being able
to do business.
18 A further possibility is to make the right to withdraw from contracts
mandatory for consumers.
4.4  Examples of Existing Policies
Some  of  the  policy  proposals are  actually  in  place  in  various  countries. Whether  the
democratic systems in these countries are in fact characterized by institutions that facilitate an25
effective political discourse, however, needs to be left to future research. Corresponding
testable propositions are formulated in sub-section 4.6.
Table 1 shows the adoption of policies affecting individuals’ allocation of time for a range of
developed countries with democratic governments. Column 1 reports on the provision of
maternity leave. The indicator is the product of the number of weeks of maternity leave and
the rate of pay during those weeks (OECD 2001, 144). While there is no mandatory maternity
leave provision in the United States, Australia and New Zealand, the Scandinavian countries
Denmark, Finland and Sweden have extended programs. All three Nordic countries guarantee
an equivalent of thirty or more weeks of fully paid maternity leave. There are, of course,
many differences in the national provisions not accounted for in the rough summary indicator.
The second policy brought into perspective is the legal maximum number of working hours
per week (OECD 1998, 168). While there are many country specific rules, an overview is
possible about whether working hours are a policy issue. There are six developed countries in
table 1 not restricting the number of maximum working hours per week, namely Canada, the
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The most restrictive
arrangement is in Finland, setting a maximum of 45 hours per week.
Data quality is worst for the regulation of shopping hours. In many countries, opening hours
are at least partly regulated at the sub-federal level. As an indicator for opening policies, the
maximum weekly opening hours between 8 a.m. and 12 p.m. are reported (Pilat 1997). Many
countries do not restrict opening during this time frame, indicated by a number of 112 hours.
At the other end of the range are The Netherlands, setting the maximum opening hours at 55
hours.
[Table 1 about here]26
4.5  A Reconsideration of the ‘Enlightened’ Policies
The free public debate is not the only factor influencing government policy making. Besides
the individual interests of the professional politicians, there are the special interests. They
seek to influence the political process in order to get regulations that generate or maintain
rents for them. Well-organized producer interests may well oppose many of the above-
mentioned policies, because they might reduce the returns on their invested capital (see, e.g.,
the opposition against legislation that protects a woman’s job during maternity leave).
Producers of consumer items might even oppose the regulations mentioned because they
benefit from people spending too much on their goods due to misprediction. Alternatively,
well-intended policies are often influenced by special interests and misused for their rent
seeking purposes (see the extensive debate about insider protection at the workplace at the
expense of unemployed people, or the regulation of the retail sector to protect traditional
suppliers from large new entrants).
4.6  Empirically Testable Propositions
It is in the nature of the addressed anomaly that tests based on behavioral traces are difficult.
Mispredicting utility involves behavioral consequences that seem optimal for predicted utility
but lead to a lower level of experienced utility. Therefore, we propose tests that involve
reported life satisfaction, happiness or other measures of subjective well-being as proxies for
people’s utility (for an introduction to happiness research in economics see Frey and Stutzer
2002a,b). Happiness research is increasingly used in economics to test behavioral theories (for
a discussion see Frey and Stutzer 2003b). Moreover, research on subjective well-being
contributes significant insights into the sources of people mispredicting utility.
There are two sets of testable propositions that follow from the above analysis. The first set
refers to the different predictions following from the four models of government. The second27
set takes up the refined modeling of the political process, including political discourse and
learning. These propositions are preliminary:
1.  In democracies, there is less bias in consumption and therefore people enjoy higher
utility  than  in  authoritarian  and  dictatorial  countries,  because  in  democracies
governments have to please the ‘opposition’ less frequently with goods and services
providing immediate gratification.
This is consistent with first evidence in Inglehart and Klingemann (2000): “New
evidence from the World Value Survey supports the hypothesis that a society’s level of
subjective well-being is closely linked with the flourishing of democratic institutions” (p.
177). However, the prediction of the first proposition is difficult to disentangle from the
positive incentives in democratic competition to follow citizens’ preferences.
2.  Benevolent authoritarian systems provide a less distorted set of public goods and
therefore higher happiness than non-benevolent authoritarian systems because they try to
mitigate individual biases due to misprediction rather than exploit them. What is
“benevolent” must be determined ex post.
3.  Incumbent governments in a tight race for re-election produce a higher consumption bias
and therefore lower happiness than governments in a majoritarian democracy with high
re-election chances, because the former offer or promise goods for which citizens predict
high utility.
Re-election probabilities can be determined ex post. Thus, soon after a close election,
reported subjective well-being is lower than after an election with a clear confirmation of
the incument party.
4.  Precautionary policies are more likely in countries that are characterized by institutions
that foster public discourse (like free media, proportional representation, referendums,28
democratic  party  structures).  Proxy  measures  for  the  involvement  of  people  in
discussions about politics are often included in public surveys. These measures can serve
as intermediary variables. People in countries applying precautionary regulations are
expected to be more satisfied with their life.
5  Concluding Remarks
This  paper  pursues  two  goals.  First,  it  introduces  a  decision  framework  with  people
mispredicting  utility  that  leads  to  systematically  suboptimal  behavior.  Second,  the
consequences of this anomaly are studied for different characterizations of the political
process.
Individuals are argued to systematically mispredict the future utility of goods consumed and
activities undertaken. Goods and activities characterized by stronger intrinsic aspects (such as
spending time with family and friends and pursuing hobbies) are undervalued compared to
those characterized by stronger extrinsic aspects (such as income). While people are partly
aware of this anomaly, they err when making decisions on a case-by-case basis. Learning is
slow and imperfect, so that the distorted decisions are preserved over time. As a consequence,
individuals obtain a lower utility level than if they were not subject to this systematic bias of
misprediction.
The result that the individuals are worse off according to their own best interests distinguishes
us from the more traditional “consumption critique”, according to which individuals are not
able to choose what is best for them – but what is “best” is evaluated according to outside
preferences.
Consequences of mispredicting utility are not restricted to the private realm, but also affect
people’s behavior as citizens. Thereby, two modes can be differentiated. First, on a case-by-29
case  basis  in  the  current  political  process,  citizens  evaluate  government  policy,
underestimating intrinsic attributes relative to extrinsic attributes. Second, however, the
political process can also generate conditions such that citizens get a more detached view of
their evaluation and become partly aware of their or others misprediction of utility.
In the first mode, the effects of mispredicting utility are carried forward or are even
accentuated in the political process. This mode might accurately describe government
decision-making in a perfectly competitive democratic system of party competition. The two
parties cannot afford to deviate from the short-term evaluation of their program by the median
voter and have to provide a policy bundle with strong extrinsic attributes. The model of
perfect party competition is, however, an “ideal type” not existing in reality. The analysis
might, however, also hold in situations when the re-election chances of the incumbent
government are low, and it starts giving presents to cater to voters’ short-term preferences.
The first mode with immediate gratification is also characterizing the policy that has to be
pursued by an authoritarian ruler. Offering “panem et circenses” is necessary to pacify the
people, mainly in the capital, and providing material benefits to the elite is necessary to
prevent a military or police takeover.
The second mode with citizens being at least partly aware of their anomalous day-to-day
behavior is a more accurate description of modern democracies. Thereby the political
discourse is the crucial mechanism that allows learning in the political process and provides
incentives to the government to be responsive to citizens’ long run preferences. While some
institutional  conditions  are  known  that  facilitate  public  debate,  there  are  many  other
institutions for which only untested propositions are put forward.
There are many different policies that can be put forward to mitigate the consequences of
people mispredicting utility. We are, however, only at the beginning of understanding30
whether they are effective in correcting people’s biases and thus increase individuals’ well-
being, or whether they are mainly the result of rent-seeking activities.31
Table 1. Legal Policies Affecting the Work-Life Balance
Maternity leave
provision
1999-2001
Legal maximum
weekly working
hours
1990s
Legal maximum
weekly opening
hours (8h-24h)
1990s
North America
Canada 8.25 None ..
Mexico 12 57 ..
United States 0 None 112
Asia
Japan 8.4 none ..
South Korea 8.5 56 ..
Europe
Austria 16 50 ..
Belgium 11.55 50 73
Czech Republic 19.32 51 ..
Denmark 30 48 63.5
Finland 36.4 45 80
France 16 48 112
Germany 14 60 66.5
Greece 8 48 112
Hungary 24 52 ..
Ireland 9.8 60 112
Italy 17.2 60 6632
Luxembourg 16 48 ..
Netherlands 16 60 (max. average
over 13 weeks is 48)
55
Norway 42 50 80
Poland 18 .. ..
Portugal 24.3 54 112
Slovak Republic 25.2 .. ..
Spain 16 47 112
Sweden 40.32 48 or 52 112
Switzerland 61 or 66 ..
Turkey 7.92 .. ..
United Kingdom 7.92 none 102
Oceania
Australia 0 none ..
New Zealand 0 none ..
Data sources: .. Data not available. The index of national maternity leave provision is the
product of the number of weeks of maternity leave and the rate of pay during those weeks.
Data is from OECD Employment Outlook 2001, Table 4.7, columns 4 and 5. Legal maximum
weekly working hours data is from OECD Employment Outlook 1998, Table 5.10, column 3.
Data for legal maximum weekly opening hours of shops is from Pilat (1997).33
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1 We borrow these categories from a large literature in humanistic or value psychology (e.g. Maslow
1968, Rogers 1961).
2 The underlying theories are manifold, and comprise, for instance, people’s urge to master their
environment for its own sake (White 1959), of being an origin (DeCharms 1968), people’s resistance
to loss of control (Brehm 1966) and the reflection of perceived control in more effective behavior and
higher positive affects (Bandura 1977, Seligman 1992).42
                                                                                                                                                                   
3  When  people  spend  time  with  friends  because  they  are  famous  and  important,  the  extrinsic
dimension becomes more prevalent.
4 Both utility measures – predicted and experienced utility – diverge from traditional decision utility
derived from individual behavior. Utility is rather understood as a hedonic experience (see Kahneman
et al. 1997).
5 Standard research designs are prospective longitudinal studies on self-reported emotions. People are
asked how happy they expect themselves to be after some event has happened or some option has been
chosen. These predictions are then compared with reported subjective well-being when actually
experiencing the new situation. There are several limits to this design: (i) Usually only predictions for
changes in the near future are assessed. (ii) The way in which scales of measurement are interpreted
can change over time, e.g., due to maturation or a change in the anchor. (iii) Predictions might also
affect actual feelings or might even become self-fulfilling prophecies. Some of these problems can be
eliminated by conducting studies between subjects, where one group’s predictions are contrasted with
a different group’s actual reports.
6 Young academics might be particularly worried about life after a negative tenure decision. Gilbert et
al. (1998) asked assistant professors how happy they would be after a positive tenure decision and
after a negative one. The answers were compared with reported subjective well-being of academics
affected by a tenure decision made five or less years before. Although assistants predicted they would
be less happy during the first five years after being turned down, there was no statistically significant
difference between those who had and had not gotten tenure. Similarly, assistants also overestimated
the positive impact of receiving tenure on their well-being.
7 In contrast, for choices made once-in-a-lifetime, learning is no option. Biased decisions can then well
affect the life path. We believe that misprediction of utility matters a lot in such life decisions (like
career choice) but we do not study them here.
8 A more fundamental reason for people’s limited learning might lie in some advantage misprediction
provides in the evolutionary process. Rayo and Becker (2003) model how humans’ utility functions
formed in order to maximize success in genetic replication. Their model rationalizes that people43
                                                                                                                                                                   
neglect adaptation (described as self-inflicted externality). In today’s world, this utility function with
an  inbuilt  misprediction,  however,  is  no  longer  helpful  to  guarantee  an  optimal  mix  between
experienced utility and motivation for success in society.
9 Systematic differences between self-evaluation and the assessment of others’ decisions is likely due
to overoptimism (Weinstein 1981). Thus people are overly confident about their own ability to make
the right decisions, while at the same time being aware that the average person mispredicts utility.
10 This argument is similar to the ones about sophisticated and naive people who are fully or not at all
aware of their future self-control problem (for a discussion of self awareness see O’Donoghue and
Rabin 2003).
11 In Loewenstein et al. (2003), however, there is no explicit modeling of differences in adaptation
across goods, attributes of different options or people.
12 There is an apparent paradox that working provides intrinsic benefits but that there can nevertheless
be too much working due to mispredicting utility. The paradox vanishes when the two natures of work
are taken into consideration. While intrinsic work enjoyment and flow might in fact be undervalued in
job choice decisions, people focus on the monetary compensation when trading-off additional working
time and time for leisure activities. For given intrinsic and extrinsic job attributes, this is hypothesized
to lead too long working days.
13 One might argue that the over-consumption of comfort goods and related biased decisions are rather
explained by agents having self-control problems (see, e.g., Laibson 2004 on intertemporal decision-
making). These agents choose goods and activities providing short run gains and incurring long run
costs.  However,  mispredicting  utility  rather  portrays  the  other  extreme  of  people.  Individuals
mispredicting utilty may choose to work extra hours over a long period of time in order to buy some
prestigious car in the end from which long lasting satisfaction is expected.
14 We are aware that the median voter model has been further developed. Recent accounts include,
e.g., the problem of mobilizing voters, fundraising, party organization, and ideological capture by
special interests. Future elaboration should take these extensions into account when analyzing how the
misprediction of utility is transformed into policies. Some aspects are discussed in section 4.2.44
                                                                                                                                                                   
15 There is strong evidence that information through the mass media encourages political competion
and  increases  government  responsiveness  to  citizens’  preferences  (Besley  and  Burgess  2002;
Stromberg 2004).
16 In a national referendum held in Switzerland in 2002, people voted on a drastic reduction in the
maximum number of legal working hours, as proposed in a popular initiative. One of the main
arguments in favor, advanced by the initiative commitee, emphasized an improved work-life balance:
“Long working weeks and stress become a health risk for more and more people. Too much work
makes people ill and work on demand is poison for family life. There is less and less time for social
contacts, education, culture, sports or voluntary work. The initiative of the SGB stops this and brings
working hours in line with health and allows for a better balance between family, job and leisure”
(Federal Chancellery 2002, our translation).
17 For the role of the media in exposing citizens to cross-cutting political viewpoints, see, e.g., Mutz
and Martin (2001).
18 In some casinos in Germany and gambling halls in the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland, one can
officially request that one be denied access to these places.